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Introduction
Municipal bond prices are tumbling and rates rising 
just as public borrowers face pressure to refinance 
deals cut during the financial crisis.  At the same 
time, the funded status of public pension plans has 
declined, and states and localities will have to come 
up with more money to meet future benefit pay-
ments.  In the private sector, numerous studies have 
shown that pension underfunding affects corporate 
bond ratings.  And Moody’s just announced that it 
would combine unfunded pension liabilities with 
outstanding bonds when evaluating a state’s leverage 
position.1  These developments raise the question of 
how future pension commitments affect today’s bor-
rowing costs in the public sector.  
The brief proceeds as follows.  The first section 
describes the municipal bond market.  The second 
section describes the factors that traditionally have 
been considered in the bond rating process.  The 
third section summarizes what other researchers have 
found regarding the relationship between pension 
commitments and borrowing costs in the private and 
public sectors.  The fourth section presents a model 
for the period 2005-2009 that relates borrowing costs 
to factors generally considered by the rating agencies, 
such as the state’s management, finances, economy, 
and debt structure.  Pensions are a component of the 
debt structure, and the extent to which states make 
their Annual Required Contribution (ARC) has a 
statistically significant – albeit modest – impact on the 
cost of debt.  A side finding is that the bond’s rating 
explains relatively little about the variation in interest 
cost, and the effect of pensions remains significant even including the bond’s rating in the equation.  The 
final section concludes that while pension underfund-
ing had only a small effect on borrowing costs in the 
2005-2009 period when pension expenses were only 3 
to 4 percent of state budgets, its impact could become 
more significant as the cost of pensions increases.   
The Municipal Bond Market
The municipal bond market is large and diverse.  In 
2010, state and local debt amounted to $2.4 trillion 
or about 6 percent of the total debt outstanding from 
business and government.2  Issuers include states, 
cities, counties, redevelopment agencies, school dis-
tricts, public utility districts, publicly-owned airports 
and seaports, and other government entities.  Ma-
jor infrastructure projects, schools, housing units, 
and public utilities are financed through municipal 
bond proceeds.  Many municipal bonds raise small 
amounts; three-quarters of the issues are for $1 mil-
lion or less.3      
Municipal bonds can generally be grouped into 
two types – general obligation bonds and revenue 
bonds.  (Of course, states can also “borrow” indirectly 
by, for example, not making their pension contribu-
tions.)  General obligation bonds are secured by the 
full faith, credit, and taxing power of the issuing en-
tity.  At the local level, the bond is typically secured by 
the taxing power of the locality.  At the state level, the 
backing is generally based on appropriations made by 
the state legislature.  In contrast, revenue bonds are 
payable from identified sources of revenue, such as 
bridge tolls for a bridge reconstruction project, rents 
from a housing project, or receipts from electric and 
gas production and transmission.  General obligation 
bonds are generally viewed as the safest.4  Interesting-
ly, general obligation bonds represent only 24 percent 
of total dollars issued during the 2005-2010 period 
(See Figure 1).5 
The Supreme Court ruled in 1895 that the federal 
government under the U.S. Constitution had no right 
to tax the interest on municipal bonds, so in most 
cases the interest is exempt from federal tax.6  In 
addition, many states exempt the interest on in-state 
bonds from the state income tax.  In 1986, however, 
the federal government tightened the qualification 
for tax-exempt status, indicating that it was no longer 
willing to subsidize (through the loss of federal 
income tax revenue) state and local activities that 
did not significantly benefit the general public.  As a 
result, borrowing for investor-led initiatives, such as 
housing projects or sports facilities, was no longer 
eligible for tax-exempt status.  The same treatment 
was accorded pension obligation bonds that states and 
localities issued to replenish underfunded pension 
plans.  The federal government’s new position was 
upheld in 1988 when the Supreme Court ruled that 
the Constitution did not preclude federal taxation of 
interest on state and local debt.7   
Figure 1. General Obligation Bonds as a Percent 
of Total Dollars of Municipal Bonds Issued, 
2005-2010





















Source: Thomson Reuters SDC Municipal Bond Dataset 
(2005-2010).
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 introduced a new type of taxable municipal se-
curity – Build America Bonds.  This program allowed 
states and localities to issue an unlimited amount of 
taxable debt on which they would receive a subsidy 
from the federal government.  As a result, taxable 
issuances accounted for a much larger percentage of 
total municipal bonds in 2009 and 2010 than in previ-
ous years (see Figure 2).  The program ended in 2010.  
Figure 2. Taxable Bonds as a Percent of Total 
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The Rating of Municipal Bonds
The interest cost on municipal bonds is directly 
related to their rating.8  The question for this brief 
is the extent to which pensions enter into the rating 
process.  Rating agencies say that they take pensions 
into account when rating municipal bonds, and state 
officials express concern over how rating agencies will 
respond to pension developments.9   
Moody’s provides a detailed description of its 
rating methodology for state-issued bonds.10  This 
methodology focuses on four aspects of each state 
– its economy, finances, debt, and management.  
Moody’s tends to put more weight on finances and 
management than on the economy and debt.  On the 
management side, the agency looks for institutional 
arrangements that lead to effective financial man-
Differences in Rating of 
Municipal vs. Corporate Bonds
The approach to rating municipal bonds differs 
from that used for corporate bonds.  While the two 
main raters – Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s 
– base their municipal bond ratings on the fiscal 
strength of the issuing entity, they rate corporate 
bonds on the risk of loss.  This approach means 
that municipal bonds have a much lower default 
history than corporate bonds with the same rating 
(see Table 1).  To eliminate this discrepancy, federal 
legislators introduced The Municipal Bond Fairness 
Act in 2008, but the legislation was not enacted.   
Table 1. Cumulative Historic Default Rates, 
1970-2006 
Rating  Moody’s S&P
categories Municipal Corporate Municipal Corporate
Aaa/AAA 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.60
Aa/AA 0.06 0.52 0.00 1.50
A/A 0.03 1.29 0.23 2.91
Baa/BBB 0.13 4.64 0.32 10.29
Ba/BB 2.65 19.12 1.74 29.93
B/B 11.86 43.34 8.48 53.72
Caa-C/CCC-C 16.58 69.18 44.81 69.19
All 0.10 9.70 0.29 12.98
Source: Frank (2008).  
agement and flexibility, processes that ensure the 
maintenance of balanced budgets, a track record of 
political compromise, and effective capital and debt 
planning processes.  In terms of finances, the target 
is a balanced operating budget, a stable and efficient 
tax system, the maintenance of a positive GAAP fund 
balance in the General Fund, strong liquidity, and no 
previous downgrades.   
Moody’s tends to put less weight on the state’s 
economy and outstanding debt.  The key economic 
factors include per capita income growth, a diverse 
industrial base, low-to-moderate sensitivity to reces-
sions, and a relatively small dependent population 
that could require large spending on education and 
Medicaid.  Debt factors include a low-to-moderate tax-
supported debt burden, a conservative debt structure 
with low-to-moderate exposure to variable interest 
rates, no or very limited use of short-term debt for 
current expenditures, and a well-funded pension 
system.  Moody’s analysts consider both the funded 
status of the issuer’s pension fund and the extent to 
which the issuer is making contributions to limit the 
growth of future unfunded liabilities, but to date pen-
sion funding is only one factor in a category that the 
analysts “underweight” in making their evaluations.11  
Findings on the Relationship 
between Cost of Funds and 
Pensions
According to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
the rate of return on a risky asset can be decomposed 
into the rate of return on a risk-free asset plus a risk 
premium.12  This risk premium reflects the issuer’s 
ability to repay its future obligations.  Although no 
state has literally defaulted since at least World War 
II, investors worry about the potential for missed, 
delayed, or renegotiated payments.13  In the case of 
corporations, default is a relevant issue.
On the public side, researchers have estimated 
the relationship between bond rates and economic 
characteristics and fiscal institutions of various issu-
ers of both state and local debt.14  Because, to date, 
comparable data on state bond rates have not been 
readily available, researchers have tended to rely on 
the Chubb’s “Relative Value Survey.”  This survey, 
which was conducted every six months between 1973 
and 1997, asked about 25 traders to estimate cur-Center for Retirement Research 4
rent yields on a hypothetical general obligation bond 
relative to bonds issued by New Jersey.15  Researchers 
generally find that existing debt burden and recent 
growth in debt tend to be associated with higher rates, 
while growth in income, revenues, or low unemploy-
ment tend to be associated with lower rates.  States 
with institutions that make it difficult to issue more 
debt or roll deficits from one year to the next also see 
lower rates.  A few studies have examined the factors 
affecting the yield on municipal bond issues.16  Here 
the property tax base and the burden of debt outstand-
ing affect both the rating and the interest rate.  To our 
knowledge, none of the studies of either state or local 
bonds explicitly include pensions in the analysis. 
On the corporate side, a number of studies have 
examined the relationship between pension fund-
ing and equity prices, and a few have looked at the 
relationship between pension funding and corporate 
debt ratings.  This literature reflects the assumption 
that, while pensions are autonomous legally, inves-
tors view pension assets and liabilities as part of an 
expanded corporate balance sheet and thus take them 
into account when valuing a corporation’s equities or 
bond rating.  The evidence suggests that the status of 
the pension fund influences both the price of equities 
and corporate debt ratings.17     
In short, the literature from the private sector 
indicates that pensions should play a role in the cost 
of funds.  To date, however, researchers have not 
explored whether this conclusion carries over to the 
public sector.  
An Empirical Analysis
In order to determine whether the funded status of 
pensions has an impact on the borrowing costs of 
states, we undertook a regression analysis based on a 
Thomson Reuters dataset of 758,000 municipal bonds 
issued between 2005 and 2010.  The dataset tracks the 
bond sale date, duration, yield at issue, if the bond is 
taxable, whether the rate is fixed or variable, and if the 
bond is insured or credit enhanced.  To have relevant 
economic/management information for each bond 
required limiting the sample to state bonds, and since 
2009 is the latest Census data, the period was lim-
ited to 2005-2009.  For ease of interpretation, we also 
focused on tax-exempt fixed-rate bonds, producing a 
final sample of about 37,500 new issues.  (Appendix A 
describes the derivation of the final sample.)
To control for differences in duration of the state-
issued securities and fluctuations in interest rates 
over time, the dependent variable is defined as the 
spread between the rate of interest on a non-taxable 
state-issued bond and on a Treasury bond of the same 
duration issued in the same week (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Spread between Yields on State-Issued 
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Note: The municipal bond spread equals the yield of a mu-
nicipal bond minus the yield in a U.S. Treasury of similar 
duration issued during the same week.  The spreads are 
weighted by the dollar amount of each bond issue.
Sources: SDC (2005-2010); and Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (2005-2010).
Before the 2008 financial collapse, state-issued 
municipal bond yields averaged about 60 basis points 
less than Treasuries of similar duration; since the 
financial collapse the pattern has reversed.  The re-
versal can be attributed to two factors.  First, Treasury 
yields dropped precipitously when investors rushed 
to safety, forcing Treasury rates down.  Second, the 
required rates on municipal bonds rose as the per-
centage of new issues with insurance dropped sharply 
(see Figure 4, on the next page).18   
Within this macro environment, the task is to 
explain why some bonds have higher spreads over 
Treasuries than others and to see whether pension 
funding has a discernible impact.  The explanatory 
variables fall into the four categories used by Moody’s, 
whether the bond is general obligation and/or credit 
enhanced, and the tax treatment of the bond interest 
within the state.Issue in Brief 5
Figure 4. Insured Bonds as a Percent of Total 
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Management characteristics were represented by 
three variables:
•  Economic advisors.  States that had a council of 
economic advisors would be considered better 
managed and therefore appear more secure to 
investors, thereby reducing interest costs. 
•  Consensus forecast.  States that based their rev-
enue projections on realistic forecasts also would 
be viewed as more credible, reducing interest 
costs. 
•  Carry deficit.  States where it was possible to carry 
deficits from one year to another and thereby 
circumvent the balanced budget mandate would 
be viewed as less well managed, thereby increas-
ing borrowing costs.     
Financial status was captured by two variables:   
•  Growth in expenditures.  States with rapid five-
year growth in expenditures would have many 
competing demands for funds and therefore have 
to pay a higher rate. 
•  Fund balance.  A positive GAAP fund balance in 
the General Fund and other key operating funds 
would reflect a consistent trend of balance sheet 
health and thereby reduce the cost of borrowing.  
Economy was represented by two variables: 
•  Unemployment rate.  At any moment in time, 
states with higher levels of unemployment face 
more financial stress and therefore would be 
forced to pay higher rates. 
•  Dependency ratio.  States with a high propor-
tion of the population under 17 and 65 and over 
would be more exposed to the budget pressures 
of education and Medicaid, and therefore would 
have to pay more on their debt.
 
Debt was represented by two variables: 
•  Debt service as a percent of revenue.  States with 
an already high level of debt service would be 
viewed as more risky and thereby forced to pay 
higher interest rates.   
•  Percent of ARC paid.  States that pay a higher 
percent of their pension plan’s ARC, which 
includes normal cost and a payment to amortize 
the plan’s unfunded liability, would have lower 
demand on their resources going forward, requir-
ing them to pay less to finance their debt.  
  
Bond characteristics included two factors:
•  General obligation.  As discussed above, general 
obligation bonds are backed by the full faith 
and credit of the state and would be expected to 
reduce the required interest cost. 
•  Credit enhanced/insured.  Investors would 
require a lower yield on bonds that were accorded 
additional security through credit enhancement 
or insurance.19  
Marginal tax rate:  Most states exempt the interest 
on domestic bonds from the state income tax; some 
states (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wis-
consin) do not.  All else equal, having the interest 
tax-exempt lowers the required premium.  This effect 
varies with the magnitude of the marginal tax rate 
that bondholders face.  This variable equals zero for 
those states that tax the interest of domestic bonds 
and equals the marginal tax rates for those that do 
not. 
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Comprehensive Results
The results of the regression are shown in Figure 5.20  
For “yes/no” variables, the bars represent the relation-
ship between the characteristic and the spread and for 
continuous variables between a one-standard devia-
tion change and the spread.  For example, bonds is-
sued in states that allow the carryover of deficits from 
one year to the next have a spread over Treasuries 
of comparable duration 13 basis points higher than 
bonds issued in states that do not allow such a car-
ryover.  In the case of the five-year growth in expendi-
tures, the bar indicates that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in that ratio would be associated with an 
additional 11 basis points on the spread. 
Generally, the variables work in the expected 
direction and are statistically significant.  The two 
exceptions are the ratio of the GAAP fund balance 
to expenditures and the dependency ratio, where the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant.21       
With regard to pensions, the results suggest that 
pensions affect the cost of state debt.22  Increasing 
the percent of ARC paid by one standard deviation 
reduces the required interest rate by 3 basis points.23  
This impact is modest compared to other factors, 
but pension costs were only a small portion of state 
budgets during the sample period – from 3.0 percent 
of state budgets in 2005 to 3.8 percent in 2008.24  Even 
if the regression is re-estimated weighting by dollar 
amounts rather than treating each bond issue equally, 
the pension effect only increases to 7 basis points.25
The Role of Moody’s Ratings 
A subsidiary question is “How do Moody’s bond rat-
ings fit into the preceding analysis?”  To explore that 
question, we proceeded in several steps.  First, we 
estimated an equation that included only the Moody’s 
rating for each bond.  Moody’s letter grades were set 
equal to 1 for Aaa and 21 for C with the intervening 
ratings taking on their respective values.  Interest-
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ingly, the Moody’s rating explained only 19 percent of 
the variance in interest rates, compared to 42 percent 
explained by all the economic/management vari-
ables reported above (See Figure 6).  Further, adding 
Moody’s rating to all the economic/management 
variables increased the percent of variance explained 
by only 4 percentage points.26  
The regression results including the Moody’s 
rating are really interesting (see Appendix Table B3).  
Not only does the Moody’s rating have a statistically 
significant impact, but the inclusion of the Moody’s 
rating variable has virtually no effect on the coef-
ficients of the economic/management variables.  In-
cluding the Moody’s rating does reduce the magnitude 
of the effect of the bond being a general obligation 
bond or being insured/credit enhanced, suggesting 
Moody’s takes these characteristics heavily into ac-
count when rating the bonds.
To determine what other factors Moody’s might 
take into account, the final equation set Moody’s 
ratings as the dependent variable.27  The results, 
shown in Figure 7, confirm that the bond character-
istics – general obligation and credit enhanced – are 
important in the Moody’s rating process.   Council of 
economic advisors, consensus forecasting, and ability 
to carry over a deficit also appear to enter the rating 
decision, which is consistent with the emphasis that 
Moody’s says it puts on management factors in the 
description of its rating methodology.  The unemploy-
Figure 6. Percent of the Spread Explained by 
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ment rate is also important.  Of course, Moody’s takes 
into account many other factors that cannot be easily 
quantified in addition to the few variables defined in 
this brief.  Interestingly, pension funding, as repre-
sented by percent of ARC paid, does not appear to 
enter into the rating decision.28
Conclusion
In conversation, state officials frequently indicate that 
they are concerned about the impact of their pension 
decisions on their bond ratings.  Our results indicate 
that, while the rating agencies say they consider pen-
sions, pension funding does not have a statistically 
significant effect on bond ratings.  In contrast, it does 
have an effect on the spread, albeit modest – 3 to 7 
basis points.  That result is not surprising given that 
pension expense accounted for only 3.8 percent of 
state budgets in 2008.  The magnitude could increase, 
however, to the extent that pensions become an in-
creasingly important component of state budgets.  
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Figure A1. Derivation of Sample from Thompson Reuters SDC Municipal Bond Dataset
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Source: Authors’ illustration from SDC Municipal Bond Dataset (2005-2009).Center for Retirement Research 15
Appendix B
Table B1. Summary Statistics of Variables Included in the Regressions





Risk premium 37,517 -0.12 0.85 -4.73 5.03
Council of economic advisors 37,517 0.54 0.50 0 1
Consensus revenue forecasting 37,517 0.50 0.50 0 1
Allowed to carry a deficit 37,517 0.16 0.37 0 1
Expenditure growth (5 year) 37,517 23.15 16.95 -34.34 58.96
Fund balance 37,517 4.42 16.49 -22.56 233.25
State unemployment rate 37,517 5.33 1.90 2.31 14.62
Dependency ratio 37,517 37.09 1.15 33.56 40.22
Debt service to revenue 37,517 7.40 2.27 2.16 18.97
Marginal tax rate 37,517 5.19 3.21 0 11
Percent of ARC paid 37,517 86.53 28.74 15.50 358.39
General obligation 37,517 0.14 0.35 0 1
Credit enhanced 37,517 0.42 0.49 0 1
Year 37,517 6.87 1.40 5 9
Moody’s rating 30,575 2.46 1.94 1 13
Note: Summary statistics shown for regression sample precluding Moody’s rating. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from SDC Municipal Bond Dataset (2005-2009); Public Plans Dataset (2005-2009); State and 
Local Government Finances (2005-2009); Current Population Survey (2005-2009); U.S. Census Bureau (2010); Moody’s Inves-
tors Service (2005-2009); National Association of State Budget Officers (2008); Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (2011); and The Tax Foundation (2005-2009).Issue in Brief 16
Table B2. Regression Results on the Spread of State-Issued Bonds, Excluding and Including Moody’s 
Rating, 2005-2009
Variable Excluding Moody’s rating Including Moody’s rating Moody’s rating only
Council of economic advisors
Consensus revenue forecasting
Allowed to carry a deficit




Debt service to revenue
Marginal tax rate






      -0.075
      (0.03)   
      -0.082
      (0.03)   
       0.130
      (0.03)   
       0.006
      (0.00)   
       0.000   
      (0.00)   
       0.098
      (0.02)   
       0.014   
      (0.02)   
       0.017
      (0.01)   
      -0.013
      (0.01)
      -0.001
      (0.00)   
      -0.426
      (0.04)   
      -0.276
      (0.03)   
       0.312
      (0.01)   
          –                           
              
      -3.199













      0.092     
      (0.01)     
      -0.065 
      (0.03)     
       0.087   
      (0.04)     
       0.006
      (0.00)     
       0.001   
      (0.00)     
       0.083
      (0.02)     
       0.016   
      (0.02)     
       0.011 
      (0.01)     
      -0.014
      (0.01)
      -0.001 
      (0.00)     
      -0.311
      (0.04)     
      -0.086   
      (0.04)     
       0.292
      (0.01)     
      -0.092
      (0.01)     
      -3.408




































      0.424





Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for state-level clustering are in parentheses.  Coefficients are significant at the 1 per-
cent level (***), 5 percent level (**), or 10 percent level (*).
Sources: Authors’ calculations from SDC Municipal Bond Dataset (2005-2009); Public Plans Dataset (2005-2009); State and 
Local Government Finances (2005-2009); Current Population Survey (2005-2009); U.S. Census Bureau (2010); Moody’s Inves-
tors Service (2005-2009); National Association of State Budget Officers (2008); Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (2011); and The Tax Foundation (2005-2009).Table B3. Regression Results on Predicting Moody’s Ratings, OLS and Ordered Probit Models, 
2005-2009
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Variable OLS Ordered probit
Council of economic advisors
Consensus revenue forecasting
Allowed to carry a deficit




Debt service to revenue
Marginal tax rate








































       -0.242
      (0.09)     
       -0.177 
      (0.08)     
      0.237     
      (0.12)     
      0.001     
      (0.00)     
       -0.001     
      (0.00)     
      0.064
      (0.03)     
       -0.067   
      (0.05)     
      0.012     
      (0.02)     
0.016
(0.02)
       -0.001     
      (0.00)     
       -0.369 
      (0.18)     
       -1.504
      (0.11)     
      0.140
      (0.02)     
               –














Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for state-level clustering are in parentheses.  Coefficients are significant at the 1 per-
cent level (***), 5 percent level (**), or 10 percent level (*).
Sources: Authors’ calculations from SDC Municipal Bond Dataset (2005-2009); Public Plans Dataset (2005-2009); State and 
Local Government Finances (2005-2009); Current Population Survey (2005-2009); U.S. Census Bureau (2010); Moody’s Inves-
tors Service (2005-2009); National Association of State Budget Officers (2008); Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (2011); and The Tax Foundation (2005-2009).About the Center
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